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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff in this case is an Idaho corporation, April Beguesse, Inc. (ABI), wholly 
owned by April Beguesse (hereinafter, "April"). The Defendants are Christa Beguesse, Inc. 
(CBI), an Idaho corporation owned by Christa Beguesse Rammell (hereinafter, "Christa"), now 
deceased, and her husband, Kenneth Rammell ("Ken"). Christa was the mother of April. Christa 
operated, through her corporation, a typesetting business that she started in 1980 in California. 
At all times relevant to this case, her business had one customer, a legal publisher known as The 
Rutter Group ("Rutter"). Rutter is now an imprint of West Publishing Co., a division of 
Thompson-Reuters Corp. Christa performed the typesetting for more than 25 of Rutter's titles, 
most of which are looseleaf services relating to various aspects of California law. Christa, due to 
her mastery of the typesetting software known as Adobe PageMaker, was able to process the 
periodic updates and new editions so quickly that she retained Rutter's business for more than 20 
years, and so efficiently that the business was quite profitable. 
In January 2002, April moved to Idaho Falls, Idaho to begin working for CBI in order to 
learn the business. It was expected that she would take it over and buy it from CBI beginning in 
2004. In January 2004, she formed ABI and took over the operation of the typesetting business 
pursuant to a contract that required her to pay $12,000 per month to CBI for eight years. Christa 
provided production help and consultation on operation of the typesetting software to April for 
several years. ABI made payments to CBI out of the cash flow of the business from February 
5 
2004 to November 2008. April has continued to operate the business since then. It has prospered 
and grown, as Rutter has added additional titles and has continued to use her typesetting services. 
In November 2008, Christa passed away unexpectedly. When April learned that her 
mother did not leave her anything in her will, she quit making payments as required under the 
contract, and moved the business to Nevada. Defendants sought to enforce the contract in 
Nevada. Plaintiff had that action dismissed, and filed suit in Idaho alleging breach of contract 
and fraud. At trial in April 2012, a jury found fraud by Christa, Ken, and CBI, and breach of the 
contract by CBI, and awarded damages. The Court below denied Defendants' Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. However, it set aside the finding of fraud against the 
Estate of Christa Beguesse, holding that there was no evidence of fraudulent statements by 
Christa. The Court below granted a remittitur reducing the damage award, finding that the 
amount stated by the jury was not supported by evidence and was the result of passion and 
prejudice. Defendants appealed. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Defendants Kenneth Rammell and Christa Beguesse Rammell were married in California 
in 1988. 1 Christa was at that time owner of CBI, a California corporation, and did typesetting 
work for several customers, including Rutter. 2 By 1996, Rutter was her only customer. 3 In 1996, 
Ken retired from his accounting practice, and Ken and Christa moved to Idaho Falls.4 Christa 
dissolved the California corporation and created a new Idaho corporation. Ken and Christa each 
owned 50 percent of the stock in the new corporation.s and continued to provide typesetting 
1 T. 317 
2 T. 319 
3 T. 319 
4 T. 317-318 
5 T. 318 
6 
services for Rutter from Idaho Falls. 6 Ken provided some bookkeeping services but had limited 
involvement in CBI's operations.? He had no expertise in or particular knowledge about 
. 8 kn A '1 9 typesettmg, as was own to pn. 
As an example of the business' profitability, in 2000, CBI had revenues of$238,140.00,10 
and profits of$127,885. 11 Figures for 1999 were similarY 
In 1999, Ken and Christa had some estate planning perfonned. They claimed all assets as 
community property, including their shares in CBI. At that time, they valued the business at 
$40,000.00,13 based on the value of its cash and physical assets.14 They were aware at that time 
that the business would have no value as a going concern if Christa were to die or retire, because 
the business relied on her work and knowledge to earn income. I5 
Some time after that, Ken and Christa began considering how to configure the business to 
provide them a retirement income and to provide for Christa's children. 16 Ken calculated that 
with an appropriate person running the business, it could provide retirement income for him and 
Christa and a good income for the person operating it. 17 The value of the company lay not in its 
assets considered separately, but in its ability to earn substantial income from its work for 
Rutter. 18In September 2001, they invited April to meet with them about the proposal. 19 
6 T. 319 
7 T. 320 
8 T. 322 
9 T. 176-177 
10 T. 327 
11 T. 328 
12 T. 327 
13 T. 336 
14 T. 363 
15 T. 336, 359, 365 
16 T. 359-360 
17 T. 359-360 
18 T. 456 
19 T. 81-82 
7 
Christa proposed that April move to Idaho Falls and go to work for CBI to learn the 
business. After two years working for CBI, she would take over the business, making monthly 
payments to CBI for eight years?O According to April, it was suggested to her that when she was 
ready to retire, she could make the same deal with another person.21 April testified that she was 
told that the deal was "an investment in my future," which she interpreted to mean "that the 
monies were going to go into her (Christa's) estate; and then, of course, when Christa passed, the 
estate was going to be divided.,,22 She testified she understood she would be able to make the 
same deal "on the back end to secure my retirement.,,23 She testified that Christa told her, "you 
can get your inheritance sooner or it will be less than eight years once I pass," which she said she 
interpreted to mean that payments would cease if Christa died in less than eight years?4 April 
testified that she did not rely on any statements by Ken regarding the operation ofthe business?5 
She relied on some statements he made regarding the business' finances, principally a cash flow 
projection that he prepared?6 
April accepted the proposal, moved to Idaho Falls, and went to work for CBI on January 
6, 2002?7 The plan was that she would spend a year learning how the business operated and 
interacted with its customer, and meeting the principals with Rutter.28 On January 7, 2002, she 
sent a letter to Rutter's president, Linda Diamond, introducing herself and announcing that she 
was joining CBI and would be working with her mother.29 April testified that Christa worked 
20 T. 83-84 
21 T. 84 
22 T. 106 
23 T. 107 
24 T. 108 
25 T. 176 
26 T. 176-177, Ex. B 
27 T. 111 
28 T. 112 
29 ~ "~ 
I .. 1.1.-' 
8 
"meticulously" over this two-year period to make the transition acceptable to the customer.30 
April testified that she needed to be trained in the methods that her mother used at that time to do 
the work.31 She testified that developing the knowledge to use the PageMaker software to typeset 
the customer's books took years of Christa's work.32 
In December 2003, right before April took over the typesetting business for good, Christa 
advised Rutter of the change and indicated that she would continue to work with ABI on a 
consulting basis.33 April acknowledged that she had to prove herself to the customer to make the 
deal work. 34 She continued to use the methods and processes that her mother developed and 
taught her.35 As a result of her mother's work in training her, preparing her, and preparing the 
customer for the change, April was able to assume the typesetting business with no objection 
from the customer. 36 
Prior to April making the transition and taking over the business, Ken prepared a cash 
flow projection for ABI for 2004.37 This was the only information from Ken that April relied on 
in deciding to purchase the business.38 This document projected monthly cash flow for the 
business, to demonstrate how ABI could make payments of $12,000.00 per month to CBI while 
meeting expenses and paying April salary, benefits, and profits.39 The cash flow projected sales 
for 2004 of $320,871.00.40 ABI's actual sales for 2004 were $316,000.00.41 Ken projected April 
would take out in salary and profits (net of payments to CBI and all expenses, including health 
30 T. 189-191 
31 T. 121-124 
321. 250 
331. 120, 191, Ex. 9 
341. 193-194 
35 T. 121 
36 T. 236-237 
37 Ex. B 
38 T. 176.16-177.2 
39T.178-182 
40 T. 184, Ex. B 
41 T. 186 
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insurance and April's car payments) of $72,000.00.42 Her actual salary and profits for the year 
were $68,000.00.43 Ken's projection, which was the only statement by Ken that April relied on, 
was substantially accurate. 
The parties eventually reduced the agreement to writing, which took the form of a lease 
44 h 45 . agreement. T e arrangement was so structured for tax purposes. (Structunng the deal as a 
lease benefitted ABI, in that it could deduct the payments as business expenses, and caused CBI 
to show them as ordinary income rather than capital gains.46) Although the Court below ruled 
that the writing did not fully reflect the terms of the agreement, because it was a sale, not a lease, 
April testified the writing accurately stated the substantial terms of the agreement, including the 
requirement for payment of $12,000.00 per month for eight years.47 Mr. Rammell testified that 
he was not aware of any term of the agreement between CBI (of which he was an owner and 
officer) and ABI that the payments would cease on Christa's death. He said the payments were to 
provide retirement income for himself and his wife, and he would not have agreed to such a 
At her death, Christa left a will leaving her entire estate to her husband. April challenged 
the will in a probate action, but 10st.49 
When ABI took over the typesetting business in January 2004, it received the exact same 
equipment, computers, software, and files that CBI had used to run the business until a few days 
42 T. 185 
43 T. 188-189 
44 Ex. 2 
45 T. 343 
46 T. 454-455 
47 T. 264-267 
48 T. 451-452 
49 In the Matter of the Estate of Christa 8eguesse Ramme/l, Bonneville County Case No. Case No. CV-09-1682, 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on Petition for Formal Adjudication of Testacy and Motion to 
Remove Personal Representative, August 16, 2011. 
10 
before. 50 ABI has continued to use CBl's files, software and methods to serve its customer. 
ABI's financial perfonnance in the following years was as followS 51 : 
Year I Gross Revenue Salary to April Profits Paid to CBI 
2004 316,000 48,000 20,000 144,000 
2005 350,000 48,000 28,000 144,000 
2006 395,000 50,000 55,000 144,000 
2007 435,000 46,000 100,800 144,000 
2008 430,000 48,000 74,000 132,000 
20095:'- 427,000 57,500 80,000 0 
2010 408,000 55,500 145,000 0 
20n::>j 400-410,000 Similar Similar 0 
April testified that Christa taught her how to use the PageMaker typesetting software the 
way CBI used it.54 She worked with Christa using this software on an almost daily basis until her 
death. 55 April testified that at the 2001 meeting, Christa told her she would get "a type of 
proprietary software she told me she created to work with the Rutter Group.,,56 April testified 
Christa told a local civic group called the Exchange Club, at a meeting April attended, that 
Christa had "come up with a program to make the operating processes much more easily and just 
invented this operating system to make these books."s7 This was her sole testimony regarding 
50 T. 221-222 
51 T. 185-186 for 2004; T. 204-209 for remaining years 
52 ABI moved its operations to Las Vegas in March 2009 and incurred increased expenses. T. 207 
53 April was "not prepared to answer" at trial questions about ABl's revenues and profits in 2011. T. 211 
54 T. 245.2-246.22 
55 T. 247.3-.7 
56 T.150.15-.20 
57 T. 151 
11 
I 
alleged false statements of fact regarding the software. A witness who was present at Christa's 
Exchange Club presentation, attorney Stephen Hall, testified that he asked Christa a question 
about the program she said she wrote or developed to streamline her production process. 58 
Christa told him that she used "one of the off-the-shelf publishing software packages59 ... I think 
during her presentation she told us all that it had taken a lot of work for her to do.,,6o 
April testified that in November of 2006, almost five years after she started working with 
the program, she upgraded the PageMaker software61 and read the manual for the first time.62 
She discovered by reading the manual that "it wasn't a proprietary programming system. It was 
just actually a lot of dedicated hard work of reading the PageMaker manuals and stringing some 
macros and commands together that anyone could do.,,63 
Christa died suddenly in November 2008. April testified that as she and Ken were leaving 
the funeral home after making arrangements for Christa's burial, April asked about when they 
would have "a reading of the will,,,64 and was told there would be none. She asked again after the 
funeral, and was told that "nothing was going to change.,,65 She said she "began to pay attention 
to her life" at that point, and called the president of Rutter. 66 April asked "the files I have on my 
server, am I able to - do I own them and am I able to sell them, you know, when I retire?,,67 The 
58 T. 445.9-449.4 
59 T. 447.22-.23 
60 T. 448.15-.16 
61 T. 151.13-152.25 
62 T. 257.11-.24 
63 T. 152.18-.25 
64 T. 143.19-.21 
65 T. 143.25 
66 T. 145.20-.25 
67 T. 147.2 
12 
president of Rutter responded, "no.,,68 The Court below admitted this testimony for the limited 
purpose of showing April's knowledge and notice of Rutter's position.69 
April testified about the significance of the "library of files" as follows: 
My understanding of the library of files was, I was purchasing them, the tangible files on 
the server. And what I was promised and what I was paying a million plus for was in 
tum, when it was time for me to retire, I could then in tum sell those files to a third 
party. 70 
April testified she expected she would be able to make a deal with a third party similar to 
her own arrangement with CBl, in which the buyer would be trained and made acceptable to 
Rutter before the transfer took place.71 April acknowledged on cross-examination that she was 
aware that the files could only be sold in a transfer of the business to a third party who would 
take over Rutter's typesetting: 
Q. So isn't it true that you were aware at the time you entered into this agreement 
with your mother's company that you could not simply sell these nIes to anybody, 
you could only sell them to somebody who was taking over the business? 
A. I'm not sure that question - why would I sell the files to somebody who wasn't taking 
over the business? 
Q. Exactly my point. It only - those nIes would only go to somebody who was taking 
over the business. 
A. And going to be doing work with the Rutter Group; that's correct. 
Q. Absolutely. Exactly my point. And you said that you were told you could sell 
them like your mother sold them to you, correct? 
A. I could make the same agreement that they made to me. That's what was proposed to 
me in 2001. 
Q. Oka~. So the answer is "yes"? 
A. Yes. ~ 
The President of Rutter, Linda Diamond Raznick, testified by deposition. She stated 
Rutter had no written or oral agreements with CBI or ABI, but owned the copyright in the files 
68 T. 147.6 
69 T. 147.8-.14 
70 T. 116.8-,12 
71 T. 84.11-.25 
72 T. 234.25-236.18 
13 
they possessed.73 On further questioning, Ms. Raznick confirmed that her ground for asserting 
that April would not have the right to sell her PageMaker format files to a third party is that 
Rutter owns the copyright. 74 She testified, "It is our proprietary information. It is not hers to give 
away or to sell or to do anything with without our approval.,,75 Thus, the customer's testimony 
was clear and uncontradicted that ABI could, in fact, transfer the files to a third party along with 
the rest of the typesetting business as long as Rutter approved, just as CBI had sold the business 
to ABI. 
April testified she has never attempted to sell the business to a third party the way CBI 
sold it to her.76 
ABI made no further payments under the contract with CBI after Christa's death. 77 There 
are still owing to CBI 37 payments of$12,000.00 each, for a total of $444,000.00.78 
April brought this action in August 2009.79 The Complaint made the following claims in 
eight counts: 
1. Declaratory relief. 
2. Fraud regarding ownership and value of the "library of files" containing copies of 
Rutter's books in PageMaker format. 
3. Fraud regarding a "guaranteed self-sustaining contract" with Rutter, which was 
dismissed on summary judgment because April admitted she was aware that there was no 
73 T. 300, Deposition of Linda Diamond Raznick 30-31 
74 T. 303, Deposition of Linda Diamond Raznick 38.15-.18 
75 T. 302, Deposition of Linda Diamond Raznick 37.6-.19 
76 T. 237.6-239.15 
77 T. 148 
78 T. 378 
79 R. 19 
14 
contract with Rutter, but only that it would be difficult for Rutter to take the work in-house or to 
. 80 
a competItor. 
4. Fraud regarding the proprietary software. 
5. Fraud regarding "other intellectual property," which was dismissed on summary 
judgment because Plaintiff was unable to specify what this other intellectual property was.81 
6. Fraud based on alleged misrepresentations that Christa would provide in her will that 
payments to CBr would cease on Christa's death; on summary judgment, the Court below found 
that such a promise was not enforceable but statements as to the existence of a will could support 
a fraud claim.82 However, the Court dismissed it on motion for directed verdict,83 but the Court 
never advised the jury of this ruling, and permitted testimony about the existence of a will to be 
used to determine the terms of the agreement. 84 Plaintiff nevertheless argued fraud in the alleged 
statements as to the existence of a will and misrepresentations of the terms of the contract. 85 
7. Fraud based on failure to disclose Ken's ownership interest in CBI. This claim was 
dismissed on directed verdict because there was no showing that this was material. 86 
8. Constructive fraud. This was dismissed on summary judgment. 87 
9. Breach of contract regarding the "guaranteed self-sustaining contract" with Rutter; 
which was dismissed on summary judgment. 88 
80 R. 107 
81 R. 108 
82 R. 109 
83 T. 437 
84 T. 436-438 
85 T. 515-516 
86 T. 436 
87 R. 110 
88 R. 112 
15 
10. Breach of contract related to the "proprietary software." The Court below ruled on 
summary judgment89 that this claim would be barred by the statute of limitations,9o but that 
equitable estoppel may apply to prevent the application of the statute. 
11. Breach of contract related to other intellectual property, which was dismissed on 
. d 91 summary JU gment. 
12. Breach of contract related to the "library of files." The Court held that the statute of 
limitations did not bar this claim because it did not arise until an adverse claim to the "library of 
files" was made.92 
13. Breach of contract based on CBI's failure to provide consulting services after the 
death of Christa. This was dismissed on summary judgment based on impossibility and because 
ABr never made a demand that CBr perform by providing alternative consulting services.93 
14. Breach of warranties regarding the assets including the library of files, the proprietary 
software, other intellectual property, and the guaranteed contract. The guaranteed contract claim 
and the claim regarding other intellectual property were dismissed on summary judgment on the 
same grounds fraud and breach claims on these subjects were dismissed. 94 
15. Unjust enrichment. This claim was dismissed on summary judgment. 95 
16. Quasi-estoppel. This claim was dismissed on summary judgment. 96 
At trial, April provided the sole testimony regarding ABI's damages for fraud and breach 
of contract and warranty. She testified that ABI made payments under the contract with CBr 
89 R. 113 
90 I.e. §§ 28-2-725, 5-217 
91 R. 113 
92 R. 113-114 
93 R. 115 
94 R. 115 
95 R. 116-117 
96 n ..,., n 
1\ • .L.LO 
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totaling $708,000.00 between February 2004 and November 2008. 97 She testified that the value 
of what she received in January 2004 was, in her opinion, "about $250,000.00.,,98 She testified 
she was thereby damaged in the amount of the difference, or $455,000.00.99 She testified that she 
probably could not sell the business for $250,000.00 because she did not own the files. loo 
April offered no testimony as to the damages she suffered because she did not receive the 
"proprietary software," other than to state that the PageMaker software she received retailed for 
about $600.00. 101 She did not in her testimony place a value on the "proprietary software." 
Thus, the entirety of her evidence of damages was the difference in value between what 
she paid CBI and what she claims she received as of January 1, 2004, which figure resulted from 
her unsubstantiated belief that she was unable to sell the business. 
At the close of the Plaintiffs case, Defendants moved for Directed Verdict, which was 
granted in part. The Court below granted directed verdict as to the fraud claims based on 
misrepresentations as to Ken's ownership interest in CBI, I 02 and as to the claim regarding 
misrepresentations as to Christa's will.103 The Court, however, denied a directed verdict on the 
fraud claims,104 including those against the Estate,105 even though no evidence of any statement 
by Christa to April was admitted against the Estate. The Court below did not advise the jury that 
it had granted directed verdict on the two fraud claims. 
The jury found fraud by Christa, Ken, and CBI, and breach of the contract by CBI, and 
awarded damages in the amount of $354,000.00 for fraud, and $190,013.00 for breach of 
97 T. 156 
98 T. 158.15 
99 T. 158.16-.19 
100 T. 158.20-159.5 
101 T. 157.14 
102 T. 436 
103 T. 437 
104 T. 438 
105 T. 439 
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contract with regard to the library of files. 106 The jury awarded nothing for breach of the contract 
d· h . ft 107 regar mg t e propnetary so ware. 
The Court below denied Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict. 108 However, it set aside the finding of fraud against the Estate of Christa Beguesse, 
holding that there was no evidence of fraudulent statements by Christa. 109 The Court below 
denied Defendants' Motion for New Trial; IIOhowever, it granted a remittitur reducing the 
damage award by $90,113.00, finding that the amount stated by the jury was not supported by 
evidence and was the result of passion and prejudice. 111 Defendants appealed. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the District Court erred in Denying Defendants' Motions for Directed Verdict 
and JNOV because there was insufficient evidence to support an award of damages. 
2. Whether the District Court erred in denying motions for directed verdict and JNOV on 
Plaintiff s fraud claims because Plaintiff did not prove fraud by clear and convincing evidence,. 
3. Whether the District Court erred in denying directed verdict and JNOV on Plaintiffs 
claims of fraud and breach of warranty because representations of value are not statements of 
fact or warranties. 
4. Whether the District Court erred in denying directed verdict and JNOV on the breach 
of warranty claim regarding the library of files because a mere adverse claim of ownership does 
not establish a breach of the warranty oftitle. 
106 R. 410 
107 R. 411 
108 R. unnumbered page following 494. Page 4 of Order on Motion JNOV or New Trial. 
109 1d . 
110 R. 495 
111 R. 495-496 
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5. Whether the District Court erred in denying directed verdict or JNOV on Plaintiff's 
claims of fraud and breach based on the alleged misrepresentation of ownership of the library of 
files, because the claim lacks a foundation in fact and law based on the evidence heard at trial. 
6. Whether the District Court erred in denying directed verdict or JNOV on Plaintiff's 
claims of fraud and breach related to the proprietary software, for failure to prove damages. 
7. Whether the District Court erred in denying directed verdict or JNOV on Plaintiff's 
claims of fraud and breach related to the proprietary software, for failure to prove the materiality 
of the alleged misrepresentations. 
8. Whether the District Court erred in denying directed verdict or JNOV on Plaintiff's 
claims of fraud and breach related to the proprietary software, for failure to prove false 
statements of fact. 
9. Whether the District Court erred in denying directed verdict or JNOV on Plaintiff's 
claims of fraud and breach related to the proprietary software, for failure to prove reasonable 
reliance. 
10. Whether the District Court erred in denying directed verdict or JNOV on Plaintiff's 
claims of fraud against Kenneth Rammell for failure to prove material misstatements and 
justifiable reliance. 
11. Whether the District Court erred by admitting irrelevant testimony regarding Christa 
Beguesse's will. 
12. Whether the District Court erred by submitting to the jury fraud claims on which the 
Court had granted directed verdict. 
13. Whether the District Court erred in failing to grant directed verdict or JNOV that the 
breach of warranty and contract claims were barred by the statute oflimitations. 
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14. Whether the District Court erred m failing to grant a new trial with regard to 
Defendant CBI's counterclaim. 
15. Whether Appellant is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Supreme Court on appeal reviews de novo a district court's decision to deny a motion 
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Griff, Inc. v. Curry Bean Co., Inc., 138 Idaho 315, 
319,63 P.3d 441,445 (2003) (citing Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 311,17 P.3d 247,255 
(2000)). The standard of review of a grant or denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict is the same as that of the trial court when ruling on the motion. Horner v. Sani-Top, 
Inc., 143 Idaho 230, 233, 141 P.3d 1099, 1102 (2006) (citing Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 
764, 727 P.2d 1187, 1192 (1986)). A trial court will deny a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict if there is evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value that 
reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion to that of the jury. Id. (citing Hudson 
v. Cobbs, 118 Idaho 474, 478, 797 P.2d 1322, 1326 (1990)). A trial court is not free to weigh the 
evidence or pass on the credibility of witnesses, making its own independent findings of fact and 
comparing them to the jury's findings. Griff, Inc., 138 Idaho at 319,63 P.3d at 445. A trial court 
reviews the facts as if the moving party admitted any adverse facts and draws all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Ricketts v. E. Idaho Equip., Co., Inc., 137 Idaho 
578,580,51 P.3d 392, 394 (2002). 
"A motion for judgment n.o.v. based on I.R.C.P. 50(b) is treated as simply a delayed 
motion for a directed verdict and the standard for both is the same." Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 
759,763,727 P.2d 1187, 1191 (1986). A judgment n.o.v. "can be used by the district court to 
correct its error in denying a directed verdict." Hudson v. Cobbs, 118 Idaho 474, 478-479, 797 
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P.2d 1322, 1327 (1990). The central question on review in a judgment n.o.v. is whether, after 
viewing the evidence in light most favorable to the non-moving party, "the evidence is of 
sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as 
did the jury." Smith v. Praegitzer, 113 Idaho 887, 890, 749 P.2d 1012, 1015 (App. 1988). "A 
judgment n.o.v. should be granted when there is no substantial competent evidence to support the 
verdict of the jury" Brand SCarp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 732-733, 639 P.2d 429,430 (1981) 
and when there is "but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable minds could have 
reached" Beco Constr. Co. v. Harper Contr., 130 Idaho 4, 8, 936 P.2d 202, 206 (App. 1997). 
Rule 50(b) is intended to give "the trial court the last opportunity to order the judgment that the 
law requires." Quick, 111 Idaho at 764, 727 P.2d at 1192. 
When considering an appeal from a district court's ruling on a motion for new trial, this 
Court applies the abuse of discretion standard. The appellate Court must recognize the district 
court's wide discretion to grant or refuse to grant a new trial, and, on appeal, a court will not 
disturb a district court ruling, absent a showing of manifest abuse of that discretion. This Court's 
primary focus is on the process by which the district court reached its decision, not on the result 
of the district court's decision. Thus, the sequence of this Court's inquiry is: (1) whether the 
district court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the district court 
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the district court reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason. Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 780 
(2001) 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred in Denying Defendants' Motions for Directed Verdict 
and JNOV Because There Was Insufficient Evidence to Support Damages 
The Court below erred in not directing a verdict in favor of the Defendants on all fraud 
and breach of contract claims, because the evidence was insufficient to prove any amount of 
damages. To successfully bring an action for fraud, a plaintiff must establish the existence of the 
following elements: (1) a statement or a representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; 
(4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that there be reliance; (6) the 
hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) justifiable 
reliance; and (9) resultant injury. Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927,931 (2007). All nine elements 
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker Landmark, Inc., 
150 Idaho 240, 250 (2010). 
Likewise, to recover for breach of contract, a plaintiff must prove damages resulting from 
the breach. "The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove not only that it was injured but that its 
injury was the result of the defendant's breach; both amount and causation must be proven with 
reasonable certainty. "Reasonable certainty" does not mean that damages need to be proven with 
"mathematical exactitude," but it does require a plaintiff to prove that damages are not merely 
speculative. Harris, Inc. v. Foxhollow Construction & Trucking, 151 Idaho 761, 770 (2011). 
The Plaintiff presented no evidence, much less clear and convincing evidence, of 
damages. The sole evidence of damages on all claims was April's testimony that the business 
was worth $250,000.00, which was less than the $708,000.00 she paid. She also testified that the 
"library of files" was worth nothing, rather the $1.2 million Ken and Christa supposedly 
represented as the value. This evidence was insufficient for the following reasons. 
i. Value of the Business. 
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April's estimate as to the value of the business was based on the unsupported assumption 
that she could not sell the business. This assumption was based on her mistaken belief that she 
does not own the files, cannot sell the files, and therefore has nothing to offer a potential buyer. 
But the testimony of Linda Diamond Raznick was clear that Plaintiff can sell the files with 
Rutter's approval, just as CBI sold the business and transferred the files to ABI with Rutter's 
approval. Therefore, the entire basis for the Plaintiff's claim of damages is factually unsupported. 
It is not clear and convincing evidence of damages, and it is speculative, because the damage has 
not yet occurred and, on the basis of the evidence presented, will never occur, because ABI can 
sell the business with Rutter's approval. 112 
In this case, the dispute is purely hypothetical: Will the Plaintiff suffer the damages 
alleged when and if the Plaintiff attempts to sell the business? A hypothetical dispute is not ripe, 
and should be dismissed. "A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or 
dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is academic or moot." Wylie v. 
State, 253 P.3d 700, 705 (Idaho 2011)(citing Idaho Schools for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. 
Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 128 Idaho 276, 281-82, 912 P.2d 644, 649-50 (1996) This dispute 
would only be removed from the realm of the hypothetical if the Plaintiff proved that the 
business cannot be sold - but the evidence was to the contrary. The business can be sold, just as 
it was sold to her. 
This Court has held that "fraud alone, without damage, is not actionable, nor is damage 
without fraud, but when the two concur, an action lies. The party seeking damages or relief on 
the ground of a false representation must show that he has been damaged or prejudiced because 
of it." Cooper v. Wesco Builders, 76 Idaho 278, 284, 281 P.2d 669, 672-673 (1955) (citing 32 
112 As April testified, this was all she ever expected, because she understood she could one day sell the business to 
a third party the way CBI soid it to her - i.e., with Rutter's approval. T. 84.11-.25; 235.12-.18 
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A.L.R.2d 226, Fraud, § 23; 37 c.J.S., Fraud, § 103, pp. 408-409) (internal citations omitted); see 
also 37 Am Jur 2d, Fraud and Deceit § 272. Additionally, "there is no damage where the position 
of the complaining party is no worse than it would be had the alleged fraud not been committed." 
!d. (citing 23 Am.Jur. 994, Fraud and Deceit, § 175). Finally, "damages must also be certain, ... 
such as can clearly be defined and ascertained." Id. (citing 23 AmJur. 995, Fraud and Deceit, § 
176). 
The law pertaining to damages as outlined above applies with the same force in the 
breach of contract and warranty context. The burden is "upon a plaintiff in a breach of contract 
case to prove not only that it was injured, but that its injury was the result of the defendant's 
breach; both amount and causation must be proven with reasonable certainty." Watkins Co., LLC 
v. Storms, 152 Idaho 531,539,272 P.3d 503 (2012) (citing Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., 
143 Idaho 733, 740, 152 P.3d 604, 611 (2007) (internal citations omitted). 
Thus, the damages must not only be proven, but must be shown to have flowed from the 
breach or fraud alleged. 
Here, Plaintiff contended at trial that ABI had been defrauded and the contract breached 
because the value of the business was misrepresented. Plaintiff claimed damage because she 
could not sell the business. The business was worth less than represented because it could not be 
sold to a third party; the business could not be sold to a third party because it allegedly did not 
"own" a "library of files" that it could sell to a third party. All of the claimed damages, for both 
fraud and breach, flowed from this inability to sell the business. 
However, there was absolutely no proof at trial that Plaintiff could not sell the business. 
April Beguesse admitted that she has never actually attempted to sell the business. No expert 
testified that she could not sell the business. In fact, the only evidence at trial was that Linda 
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Diamond-Raznick told April that she could sell ABI with Rutter's pennission,113 just as April's 
mother and CBI had done with April. Thus, there was no evidence that ABI suffered damages. 
The damages April testified to are remote and speculative, because they would be 
incurred only upon an event that has not and may never happen - Rutter's refusal to do business 
with a third party to whom April proposed to sell the business. That April could apply a precise 
number to those damages at trial does not remove them from the realm of speculation, because 
there is a question whether the damages have occurred or will ever occur. 
This Court adopted the following definitions of "remote" and "speculative" damages 
from 25 C.J.S. Damages §2: 
Remote damages. Remote damages are such as are the result of accident or an 
unusual combination of circumstances which could not reasonably be anticipated, and 
over which the party sought to be charged had no control." 
"Speculative damages. The tenn 'speculative damages' is sometimes used as 
synonymous with 'exemplary damages'; but ordinarily damages are said to be speculative 
when the probability that a circumstance will exist as an element for compensation 
becomes conjectural. .. 114 
The damages April testified to are remote, in that they assume a circumstance that is 
beyond the control of the Defendants (and which April knew was beyond the control of the 
Defendants, since she admitted that she knew that she did not have control over the customer's 
choice of typesetters). They are speculative because the probability that Rutter will deny 
approval of her sale of the business is purely conjectural, and will depend upon facts unknown at 
this time, including some wholly within ABI's control, such as her choice of a buyer. 
Where injury is remote, contingent, and not necessarily a proximate result of the acts 
complained of, an action in fraud may not be maintained. Bryant Motors v. American States Ins. 
Cos., 118 Idaho 796, 800 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990) 
113 T. 302, Deposition of Linda Diamond Raznick 37.6-.19 
114 Lochvood Graders v. Neibaur, 80 Idaho 123, 128; 326 P.2d 675, 677-678 (1958) 
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In summary, April's testimony that she was damaged in an amount equal to the 
difference between what she paid for the business and what she believes it was worth in 2004 is 
contrary to the evidence, remote, and speculative. Therefore, there was no evidence of damage 
resulting from fraud or breach of contract, much less clear and convincing evidence. 
ii. Ownership and Value of the Library of Files. 
The only other evidence that would appear to establish a basis for an award of damages 
was April's testimony that the "library of files" was represented to her to be worth more than $1 
million, but was actually worthless because the files were "owned" by Rutter and could not be 
sold to a third party. 115 As April acknowledged, however, she understood that the files could not 
be sold apart from the business, and therefore had no value as a separate asset. 116 Her testimony 
about the value of the library of files, then, is essentially the same as that regarding the value of 
the business as a whole: that it has no value because she cannot sell it the way CBI sold it to her, 
as it was represented she could do. And for the same reasons as stated above, this testimony does 
not establish any damages, because the evidence was undisputed that she can sell the files in the 
same way eBl sold it to her - with Rutter's approval. By her own testimony, this is what was 
represented to her, and what she received. 
Because ABI's measure of damages requires that it be unable to sell the business in the 
manner represented to April, and the undisputed evidence at trial was that it can sell the business 
in that manner, April's testimony failed to prove any damages. Without proof that ABI cannot 
sell the business, there are no damages, and the fraud and breach of contract claims must fail. 
In addition, the Plaintiff failed to prove that Rutter "owns" the files. There was evidence 
presented that Rutter claims to own the copyright in its books, and evidence that April became 
115 See footnotes 70 to 74, supra, and accompanying text. 
116 T. 234.25-236.18. See footnote 72, supra, and accompanying text 
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aware of that claim after Christa's death, but there was no evidence or testimony that was 
sufficient to enable the jury to determine ownership of the files that were on ABI's computer. 
The jury was not instructed in the applicable law. No expert witness testified to establish 
ownership of the files, or the effect on ownership that Rutter's claim to the copyright would have 
on ownership of the files. 117 The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, at 
best established only that Rutter owned the copyright, and asserted that because of its copyright, 
ABI could not transfer possession of the files without its permission. This evidence is not 
sufficient to establish actual ownership of the files that CBI transferred to ABI. 
Rather, the Plaintiffs measure of damages assumes that Rutter, not Plaintiff, owns the 
files. Damages follow from the evidence presented at trial only if one assumes that April was 
correct that Rutter owns the files and ABI cannot sell them. But neither a jury nor a judge may 
simply assume the facts supporting the Plaintiffs damage claims. A plaintiff must prove its 
contract damages, both amount and causation, with reasonable certainty. Watkins Co., LLC v. 
Storms, supra, 152 Idaho at 539. Plaintiff must prove fraud damages with clear and convincing 
evidence. Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker Landmark, Inc., supra, 150 Idaho at 250. Evidence based on 
unwarranted assumptions is not clear and convincing. Plaintiff cannot assume causation; April's 
testimony about damages is meaningless, as her evidence did not prove damages were incurred. 
Because the Plaintiff failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could have 
concluded that ABI suffered damages, the District Court erred when it failed to direct a verdict 
or grant JNOV as to all claims for fraud and breach of contract or warranty. The judgment 
entered by the Court below should be reversed. 
117 As a matter of federal copyright law, ownership of the copyright is irrelevant to the question of ownership of 
any particular copy. 17 u.s.c. § 202. 
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B. The District Court Erred In Denying Motions for Directed Verdict and JNOV on 
Fraud and Breach Claims Because Plaintiff Did Not Prove Fraud by Clear and Convincing 
Evidence, and Representations of Value are Not Statements of Fact or Warranties. 
i. Representations of value. 
In her testimony at trial, April vaguely contended that she understood the Defendants to 
have represented that the business owned a "library of files" worth more than a million dollars. 
As this amount happens to be the price that she agreed to pay for the entire business, and she 
acknowledged that she knew she could not sell the files as a separate asset, but only as part of the 
business,118 her statements can only be taken to mean that the Defendants made a representation 
of the value of the business. This is not clear and convincing evidence of a false statement of 
fact. It is well settled that representations as to the value of property are by their nature opinions, 
not statements of fact, and therefore cannot be considered warranties nor actionable 
representations of fact. See Gordon v. Butler, 105 U.S. 553, 556 (1886); Byers v. Federal Land 
Co., 3 F.2d 9, 11 (8th Cir. 1924); Fisher v. Davidhizar, 2011 Utah App. 270, 263 P.3d 440, 447 
(2011); and 37 Am Jur 2d Fraud and Deceit § 173 (2012). 
ii. Representations as to a future sale of the business. 
Similarly, a representation that she could sell the business at a later date is by its nature 
an opinion as to a future event that is beyond the control of the Defendant, and therefore cannot 
fonn the basis for a fraud or breach of warranty action. 
iii. Representations as to "ownership" of the "library of fIles." April's testimony that 
someone led her to believe that CBI "owned" the files is not clear and convincing evidence of a 
false statement of fact. First, the only evidence she presented that this statement is false is a 
contrary claim to ownership made by Rutter. But, as discussed in Section A above, the evidence 
118 T. 234.25-236.18 
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was not sufficient to establish which party actually owned the files. If ownership cannot be 
established, neither can the truth or falsity of the alleged representation. 
Second, her testimony about "ownership" of the files is inherently confused. She 
acknowledged that she received possession of the files which CBI had used to perfonn work for 
Rutter; she acknowledged that she used them up to the time of trial to perfonn work for Rutter, 
for which she was paid more than $3 million. The only sense in which she could say ABI did not 
"own" the files was in her understanding that she could not sell them to a third party.119 
On summary judgement, when the District Court dismissed April's claim of fraud based 
on an alleged representation of a "guaranteed, self-sustaining contract with Rutter," the Court 
held that her testimony had to be interpreted in the light of her special understanding of the word 
"contract" to mean some means of control over Rutter's choice of typesetters.120 In the same 
way, the claim of fraud relating to ownership of the files must be interpreted in light of her 
special understanding of "ownership" to mean the ability to sell the business to a third party. As 
discussed in Section A above, that understanding is not supported by any evidence. There was no 
evidence presented from which a jury could conclude that ABI could not sell the business to a 
qualified buyer that the customer would be willing to do business with. Ms. Beguesse never tried 
to sell the business. 121 Her customer never told her she could not sell the business. I22 The 
president of the Rutter Group testified that ABI could sell the business with Rutter's approval. 123 
And, of course, the evidence was undisputed that CBI sold the business to ABI without objection 
from Rutter or disruption of the business. 
119 T. 116.8-,12 
120 R. 107 
121T.237.6-239.15 
122 T. 243.17-.20 
123 T. 302, Deposition of Linda Diamond Raznick 37.6-.19 
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Thus, in the special sense in which April uses the word "ownership" with respect to the 
files, meaning the ability to sell them, ABI failed to prove that it did not receive ownership. 
Therefore, it was error for the District Court to deny a directed verdict and Defendant's Motion 
JNOV with respect for this fraud claim. It has no support in the evidence. 
iv. Representations relating to ownership and value, and lack of reliance. In fact, it 
should be clear to this Court that ABI's claims of fraud and breach of warranty relating to the 
ownership of the files, the value of the files, the value of the business, and the ability to sell to a 
third party, are all in fact the same claim. They all boil down to an assertion that ABI's business 
has little value because it cannot be transferred to a third party the way CBI transferred it to ABI. 
At their heart, all of these claims for fraud and breach, and the measure of damages claimed for 
them, are identical. And, they are identical also to the claim based on the alleged "guaranteed 
self-sustaining contract," which the Court below dismissed on summary judgment. This claim, 
too, was based on ABI's supposed inability to sell the business. In its Complaint, ABI alleged 
that CBI misrepresented the existence of a "guaranteed self-sustaining contract" with Rutter. 124 
April asserted that this contract was an asset of the business that she was buying. April 
eventually acknowledged during discovery that she knew all along there was no agreement with 
Rutter; 125 rather, as she testified at trial, she believed that Rutter was somehow unable to make 
changes to the typesetting files that she used, and she therefore had control over the customer's 
choice of typesetter,126 and she chose to call this control a "contract.,,127 The Court granted 
summary judgment, holding as follows: 
April understood that no contract existed. April understood that Rutter was not 
required by contract to do business with CBI (or ABI), but only that the companies had a 
124 R. 242, 11 58(a) 
125 R. 106-107 
126 T. 241.17-.25 
127 R. 107 
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good working relationship and that it would be expensive for Rutter to take its business 
elsewhere. ABI knew or should have known that at best, Rutter was, to a degree, a 
captive client. Any testimony from April that uses the term "contract" must be considered 
in light of her understanding of that term. Affidavits of Plaintiff attempting to 
subsequently re-characterize her deposition testimony will not be considered. 
Thus, the record establishes that ABI can not prove its ignorance of the falsity of 
the alleged statement regarding a guaranteed contract with Rutter. Defendants are entitled 
to summary judgment dismissing ABI's claim for fraud as it relates to this alleged 
misrepresentation. 128 
April's testimony at trial repeated this misunderstanding with respect to tt~e fraud claims 
regarding misrepresentation of the value of the files, and misrepresentations as to the ownership 
of the files. With respect to both, her testimony was not that specific false representations were 
made to her, but that she came to a mistaken understanding that the customer was somehow 
obligated to use her services, and that this obligation could be transferred to a buyer the way CBI 
supposedly transferred it to her. With regard to ownership of the files, she testified that she 
thought CBI had control over the relationship with the customer; 129 that there was a 
"partnership,,,130 by which she meant that "Christa worked very hard into performing her work to 
every detail, every need of the Rutter Group. So - and because of that, there was no need to even 
think about going anywhere else.,,131 Having ownership of the files, she went on, would have 
made it difficult for them (Rutter) to go elsewhere. 132 Just as "contract" had a special meaning 
for her, it appears that "ownership" ofthe files also has a special meaning - the same meaning, in 
fact: some kind of control over the customer relationship. 133 At trial she presented no evidence of 
any false statements by Ken or Christa that such an obligation existed. At trial, April testified 
128 R. 106-107 
129 T. 116.19-.22 
BOT. 116.22-117.4 
131 T. 119.13-.21 
132 T. 119.22-.25 
133 T. 116.19-.22 
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they told her she could someday sell the business to a third party in a similar deal. 134 But a 
reasonable buyer would interpret that statement in light of her knowledge that the customer could 
take its business elsewhere if she failed to keep the customer happy. April could not justifiably 
rely on it as a statement of fact that she could sell the business in spite of Rutter. 
Likewise, her testimony regarding the alleged misrepresentations of the value of the files 
is based on the same misunderstanding. April acknowledged that she knew the files had no value 
by themselves, but only had value to a typesetter who was doing business for Rutter. 135 Her 
testimony was that she was told the files were valuable because she could someday sell the 
business to a third party the way eBl sold it to her.136 She could not justifiably rely on this 
statement as a guarantee that she could sell the files without Rutter's permission. 
For the same reason that the Court below granted summary judgment on the "guaranteed, 
self-sustaining contract" claim for fraud, the Court should have granted directed verdict or JNOV 
on the other fraud claims. They are the same claim: that she was led to believe she could keep 
Rutter's business even if Rutter did not like her work, and that she could sell that business to a 
third party against Rutter's wishes. But, just as April was aware when she went to work for CBI 
that Rutter could take its business elsewhere, and that Rutter could take its business from ABI if 
she failed to meet their requirements, she was necessarily aware that Rutter could take its 
business elsewhere if she sold the business to a third party that Rutter objected to. She cannot 
claim to have relied on any representations that led her to believe otherwise, since she knew the 
truth. Her confusion is evidence only of her failure to reason properly, not of fraud. 
Thus, ABI presented no clear and convincing evidence that would establish any 
statements of material fact by Ken or Christa that would have caused April to believe that the 
134 T. 84 
135 T. 225.12-227.4 
136 T. 84.11-.25 
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files or the business could be sold without regard to Rutter; nor did she present any evidence, 
much less clear and convincing evidence, that any statements were false, because she never 
established that the files could not be sold in the same way CBr sold them to ABI. Plaintiff failed 
to introduce clear and convincing evidence of false, material statements of fact, and of her 
justifiable reliance on them. The Court erred in denying directed verdict and JNOV. 
C. Liability for Breach of Warranty of Title Does Not Extend to Unfounded Claims. 
The Court below should have dismissed the breach of warranty claim regarding the 
library of files. The Defendant CBr is not liable for a breach of warranty of title because of a 
mere adverse claim against the title. The plaintiff in an action for breach of covenants of title has 
the burden of proving that he was prevented from using his property by a person asserting title 
paramount to the plaintiff's. Roper v. Elkhorn at Sun Valley, 100 Idaho 790, 794, 605 P.2d 968, 
972 (1980). "The mere showing of a cloud on the grantee's title is insufficient to establish a 
breach, for the warrantor is not bound to protect his grantor against a mere trespasser or against 
an unlawful claim of title." Id., citing 20 Am.Jur.2d, Covenants, Conditions, & Restrictions §83 
(1965). In the absence of proof of Rutter's superior title, rather than its mere assertion, it was 
reversible error to permit the jury to find breach of warranty and damages on this issue. 
D. Fraud and Breach Claims Based on Ownership of Files is Without Basis in Law. 
The Court below erred when it denied directed verdict and JNOV on ABI's claims of 
fraud and breach based on the alleged representation of "ownership" of the "library of files" 
because the claim is without a legal basis. The jury found a breach of contract and warranty on 
these claims, and may have found fraud as well. However, there was no legal basis for either 
claim under the evidence presented at trial, and neither should have been sent to the jury. April 
claimed she believed she was buying a legal right incident to "ownership" of the files that does 
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not and cannot exist: namely, the right to control Rutter's choice of typesetters. Ownership of 
computer files does not carry with those particular rights; they are not incidents of ownership. 
Thus, the Plaintiff's claims of fraud and breach of warranty are premised on April's 
misunderstanding of the law, or at best a layman's misrepresentation of the law. It is well settled 
that fraud cannot be predicated on misrepresentations of law or as to matters of law. Glass v. 
Southern Wrecker Sales, 990 F. Supp. 1344 (M.D. Ala. 1998), affd, 163 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 
1998) (applying Alabama law). 
Before a claim can be sent to the jury to determine the fact question whether fraud was 
committed, it was necessary for the trial Court to answer the precedent legal question whether 
the facts, if proven, even state a claim for fraud. In this case, it was necessary for the Court to 
determine the meaning of "ownership" with respect to the files in question, to determine whether 
"ownership" of the property involved in the transaction included the rights the Plaintiff claims 
she did not receive. 
The Plaintiff's claim was that she was promised "ownership" of the files, and that she 
could later sell them to a third party "like Christa sold them to me." She claims she did not 
receive "ownership" of the files because she could not sell them to a third party to do typesetting 
work for the Rutter Group without the Rutter Group's permission. She concluded from this that, 
because Plaintiff is unable to direct how the Rutter Group will use the files or who the Rutter 
Group may work with, she cannot sell her business. The damages she claims result exclusively 
from this supposed (and completely unproven) inability to sell the business. 
A relevant fact established by the evidence is that Plaintiff was aware at the time she 
agreed to purchase the business that CBI's practice was to provide the Rutter Group with a 
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complete copy of the files in question in PageMaker format. 137 She was aware that CBI did not 
have exclusive possession of these files, as the customer had a copy. She was also aware that the 
files had no value except for purposes of doing typesetting work for the Rutter Group. 
Plaintiff s claim thus defines "ownership" of the files to include the right to sell the files 
to a third-party typesetter and require the Rutter Group to use that third party's services, or to 
require the Rutter Group to purchase the files from the Plaintiff even though Rutter already 
possesses a copy of the files. It is the Defendants' supposed failure to deliver these alleged 
incidents of ownership that constitutes the fraud and breach of warranty claimed in this case. 
However, there is no legal basis for a claim of ownership that includes such rights. Those 
alleged rights are not and cannot be incidents of "ownership" of the files ABI purchased, and 
April's belief to the contrary was unreasonable under the circumstances. Since the Plaintiff does 
not own the copyright, the files naturally and obviously have no significant value without the 
copyright owner's permission to use them to typeset new editions. April admitted this fact in her 
testimony at trial. 138 It follows that if the copyright owner withdraws its typesetting work from 
the Plaintiff, it thereby also withdraws its permission to use the files for their intended purpose, 
and they become of little value. "Ownership" of the files has nothing to do with it; there is no 
kind of ownership that would permit a typesetter to retain the value in files of this nature without 
the copyright owner's business. 
Thus, the damages April claims do not flow from a breach of warranty or a fraud, but 
from the existence of a business risk which the Plaintiff was of aware when she entered the 
agreement, as the District Court found on summary judgment139 As a matter oflaw and logic, the 
137 T. 165.22-166.13 
138 T. 234.25-236.18 
139 n ., ""7 
1'\. J.UI 
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facts presented at trial fail to state a claim of fraud or breach of warranty. The rights April claims 
to have been denied simply do not come with the property she purchased. 
The same analysis applies to any fraud or warranty claim in which the damages arise 
from the alleged inability to sell the business. The District Court erred when it denied directed 
verdict or JNOV as to the fraud and breach of warranty claims. 
E. The District Court Erred in Denying Directed Verdict and JNOV on the Claims of 
Fraud and Breach Related to the Proprietary Software. 
April claims that she believed the macros and commands that she used within the 
PageMaker software to format Rutter's books, which she used on a daily basis from January 
2002 on, were written from scratch by Christa. She testified that this understanding was based on 
Christa's statement that she would receive the proprietary software she used, and on a 
presentation Christa gave to a local civic group some time after April went to work for CBL l40 
April claims she discovered in 2006 that these commands were inherent functions of Page Maker, 
adapted and organized by her mother into an efficient work flow. The jury found a breach of 
contract with regard to this claim, so it may have found fraud as well. However, the jury awarded 
no damages for the breach, indicating that it felt the breach to be immaterial, and so it was. April 
acknowledged that the software worked as expected, and she was unable to identify any damages 
flowing from the fact that the "software" she bought was PageMaker rather than some custom 
software. 
The District Court erred when it denied directed verdict and JNOV on the fraud and 
breach claims arising from the "proprietary software" allegations. 
i. April presented no evidence of damages or materiality. April's damage testimony 
was based on her supposed inability to sell the business because she did not "own" the files. She 
140 T. 150-151 
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offered no testimony as to the value of the alleged "proprietary software," either as she believed 
it to be before discovering the truth, or after. As this claim for fraud and breach of contract and 
warranty is entirely separate from the other fraud claims, based on different facts, the Plaintiff 
must identify damages flowing from this fraud or breach. "Resultant damage" is an element of 
fraud. Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho at 931. Fraud without damages is not actionable. Cooper v. 
Wesco Builders, 76 Idaho at 284, 281 P.2d at 672-673. A plaintiff must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that any damage alleged was caused by the breach. Watkins Co., LLC v. 
Storms, 152 Idaho at 539,272 P.3d 503 (2012). 
Without evidence of damages resulting from the alleged misrepresentations regarding the 
software, the Plaintiff had no claim for fraud or breach. Without evidence showing that the origin 
of the "proprietary software" made a difference to her business, Plaintiff could not show that the 
statements were materiaL The District Court should have granted directed verdict and JNOV on 
this issue rather than let the jury find fraud with no evidence. 
ii. Plaintiff did not prove false statements of fact with clear and convincing evidence. 
In addition, ABI did not identify any false statements of fact relative to this issue. Under the 
applicable law, the statements she testified to were true. April testified Christa told her she would 
get "a type of proprietary software she told me she created to work with the Rutter GrOUp.,,141 
She then testified that in 2006 she upgraded PageMaker and discovered that "it really wasn't a 
proprietary programming system. It was just actually a lot of dedicated hard work of reading the 
PageMaker manuals and stringing some macros and commands together that anyone could 
dO.,,142 In other words, she discovered that it was a type of software that Christa had created to 
141 T. 150 
142 T. 152 
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work with the Rutter Group, that was proprietary to her because no one else knew how to do it, 
and could only recreate it with "a lot of dedicated hard work." 
The tenn "computer program" is defined in Idaho law. While the Idaho Trade Secrets 
Act, Idaho Code § 48-801 et seq., is not directly applicable to the facts of this case, it is 
nevertheless instructive in determining whether April received what was promised. The "strings 
of macros and commands" are a computer program within the meaning of the Act. A program is 
defined as information which is capable of causing a computer to perform logical operation, is 
contained on any media or in any format, and is capable of being input, directly or indirectly, 
into a computer. I.C. § 48-801(4) (The final requirement for coverage under the Act, a copyright 
notice, is not relevant for these purposes since we are not attempting to enforce the Act; we are 
simply referring to the Act for guidance in defining what a "computer program" is. A program is 
a program whether or not a copyright notice is affixed to it.) The "strings of macros and 
commands" used by April on a daily basis to process and format Rutter's books are clearly a 
computer program. 
These macros and commands, taken as a whole, would also constitute a trade secret under 
the Act, since they derive independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being 
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who 
can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and are the subject of efforts that are 
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain their secrecy. I.C. § 48-801(5). April Beguesse 
did not know these strings of commands and macros, in spite of her supposed knowledge of the 
PageMaker software. Christa Beguesse had to teach them to her over a period of years. They 
were not generally known, but were developed and kept confidential by CBI. April obtained a 
great deal of economic value from using them. That another person could theoretically recreate 
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the macros "with a lot of dedicated hard work," as April testified (T. 152), does not render them 
"readily ascertainable." I.e. § 48-801(5). 
Thus, under Idaho law, CBI delivered to the Plaintiff a computer program that qualifies 
as a proprietary trade secret. That this software was developed within the PageMaker program 
does not change this. April did not testify as to any particular statement made by her mother that 
the software was written from scratch rather than from within another program. Therefore, there 
is no evidence, much less clear and convincing evidence, from which a jury could conclude that 
Christa's statement was false. 
iii. April's belief that the software was written from scratch, and her reliance on 
that belief, were not reasonable. April worked with the software on a daily basis for five years. 
She learned that she was using strings of PageMaker macros and commands in November 2006 
when she read the manual for the first time. She testified she paid people to read the manual for 
her, that she knew that Christa was famous for reading the manual "from start to finish," and that 
the manual was "too technical" for her to understand. 143 
Deliberate ignorance on the part of the buyer does not equal fraud on the part of the 
seller. The Plaintiff had every opportunity to learn the nature of the software she was using, but 
chose not to. She cannot hide behind her reliance on other people to read the manual for her to 
shield herself from the consequences of her choice. April testified to no way in which the 
Defendants misled her about the origin of the software. Christa did not tell April that it was 
written from scratch; there was no evidence at trial that Christa said any such thing. Rather, the 
jury heard evidence that Christa admitted in a public setting that her "proprietary software" was 
compiled within PageMaker. This is inconsistent with Christa having deliberately withheld the 
information from April. April's belief that it was written "from scratch" rather than within 
143 T. 257.11-.24 
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PageMaker was unsubstantiated and unreasonable. She could not justifiably rely on a 
misunderstanding based on her own negligence and ignorance. 
Even viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the evidence at trial failed to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was a false statement of fact that April 
justifiably relied on to her detriment. Where no substantial evidence supports a claim, the trial 
court should withdraw the issue from the jury or grant JNOV. Federal Land Bank v. Parsons, 
116 Idaho 545, 549, 777 P.2d 1218,1222 (1989). 
The District Court erroneously determined that substantial evidence supported the 
Plaintiffs fraud and breach claims related to the "proprietary software," and failed to apply 
Idaho law to the facts to determine that CBI did, in fact, deliver proprietary computer software to 
the Plaintiff. The Court below erred when it denied directed verdict and JNOV, and allowed the 
"proprietary software" claim to go to the jury. 
F. The District Court Erred In Denying Directed Verdict or JNOV on Fraud Claims 
Against Kenneth Rammell. 
The evidence at trial established that Ken made no false representations of fact that April 
relied on in entering the contract with CBI. April testified that she was aware that Ken had no 
knowledge regarding the operation of the business, relations with Rutter, or the software CBI 
used. 144 She testified that he "sided,,145 and "concurred,,146with Christa regarding these matters, 
but she did not rely on his statements. "I wasn't relying on Ken for anything. He was there only 
in the capacity of being my mother's husband.,,147 
144 T. 155.3-156.3, 176.16-177.2 
145 T. 85.1-.8 
146 T. 183.3-.9 
147 T. 176.16 
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She relied only on the financial information he provided, which was primarily the cash 
flow projection for ABI for its first year of operation. 148 As discussed above, the cash flow 
projection was uncannily accurate. 
Thus, based on April's own testimony, there was no evidence from which a jury could 
find that Ken made any false, material representations of fact that April relied on. She relied on 
his financial opinions and projections, which would not be actionable. "Where actual value is 
known and false statements are knowingly made with intention to deceive, and do deceive the 
parties to whom they are made, such statements constitute actionable fraud. Such statements are 
not expressions of opinion but are statements of material facts." Fox v. Cosgriff, 66 Idaho 371, 
380 (Idaho 1945). Here, there was no evidence that either Ken or Christa intentionally made a 
false statement of value with the intent to deceive April. Therefore there was insufficient 
evidence to find fraud. The fraud claims against Ken should have been dismissed on motion for 
directed verdict or JNOV. 
G. The District Court Erred By Admitting Irrelevant Testimony of Christa's Will. 
The Court below committed reversible error when it permitted April to testify repeatedly 
about statements Christa supposedly made about the contents of her wil1.149 Such evidence 
violated Rule of Evidence 601. In addition, the will was not relevant to the issue of fraud, since 
fraud cannot be premised on a promise to make a will. Nor was it relevant to the issue of the 
contract, since the terms of the contract between the two corporations cannot be established by 
reference to a will made by one party in her individual capacity, which will the other party to the 
contract has never seen, because evidence of the will cannot establish what terms the parties 
agreed to. 
148 Ex. B 
149 T. 106-108, 131-134, 143, are a few examples of testimony elicited by Plaintiff. 
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This testimony confused the jury, and allowed it to decide the case as a will challenge, to 
the Defendants' prejudice. The Court's limiting instruction was not sufficient to prevent it. The 
Court below found that there was passion and prejudice on the part of the jury in awarding an 
amount greater than the damages claimed by the Plaintiff. 15o The District Court also concluded 
that the jury's finding of fraud against the Estate of Christa Beguesse was made in the absence of 
any evidence of any statement by Christa (per the Court's limiting instruction).151 This is also an 
indication that the jury was influenced by passion and prejudice and ignored the instructions of 
the Court. 
Further, Plaintiff argued to the jury that one of the fraudulent statements was a 
representation by Christa that payments would cease on her death. 152 Plaintiff s counsel made 
this argument despite the fact that the Court had granted a directed verdict as to this particular 
fraud claim. IS3 The Court below agreed that a misrepresentation of the tenns of a contract cannot 
be the basis of a fraud claim. A party to a contract cannot fraudulently misrepresent the tenns of 
the contract to the other party. The tenns are what are agreed to; they cannot be fraudulently 
misrepresented. The Court below, however, then pennitted evidence regarding the will to be 
evidence of the tenns of the agreement, which was error. The contents of a will which were 
never seen by one of the parties cannot possibly establish the tenns of a contract. Further, the 
Court never advised the jury of the directed verdict on the issue. As a result, Plaintiffs counsel 
was pennitted to argue to the jury that it was evidence of fraud, and the jury was pennitted to 
find fraud on the issue. 
150 R. 495 
151 R. 494 
152 T. 515-516, 524 
153 T. 436-437 
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The award of damages for fraud is similarly flawed. We can have no idea what portion of 
the damages the jury ascribed to the "fraud" by Christa Beguesse, and what portion was the fault 
of other parties. It is possible that the entirety of the fraud found by the jury lay in the failure to 
make a will which relieved April of the obligation to make payments. It is not possible to 
separate out the impennissible fraud damages from others, due to the trial Court's errors in 
pennitting this evidence and these issues to go to the jury, and in failing to instruct the jury that 
issues on which it had heard evidence were withdrawn on directed verdict. This Court, therefore, 
can have no confidence that any of the damages awarded by the jury are not the result of passion 
and prejudice, or improper evidence, or otherwise fail to comport with the law. 
By pennitting the introduction of improper evidence regarding the will, and pennitting 
the jury to find fraud against Christa Beguesse in the absence of any evidence to support it, the 
Court below erred and rendered the verdict in this case irreparably suspect. This Court cannot 
detennine whether the jury's award of damages is proper, and therefore must reverse and remand 
for further proceedings. 
H. The District Court Erred in Failing to Grant Directed Verdict or JNOV on the Breach 
of Contract and Warranty Claims as Barred by the Statute of Limitations. 
The Court below ruled on summary judgment that there was a question of fact whether 
the statute of limitations barred ABI's breach of contract claim with respect to the library of 
files. 154 The Court also ruled that the statute barred the proprietary software claim unless 
application of the statute was prevented on grounds of equitable estoppel. 155 The trial court 
submitted both issues to the jury. This was reversible error. The trial Court should have granted 
directed verdict as to both claims on statute oflimitations grounds. 
154 R. 113-114 
155 R. 113 
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With respect to the "library of files," the jury was asked whether the Plaintiff knew of 
Rutter's claim to own the files more than four years before filing SUit. 156 This was error. As 
discussed above, when ABI claims "ownership" of the files, it means the ability to sell the files. 
The testimony was undisputed that April was aware she could not sell the files without Rutter's 
permission at the time she entered into the contract. This was the basis for the Court's grant of 
summary judgment, and there is no logical reason why the same analysis would not lead to the 
conclusion that this claim is barred by the statute oflimitations. 
With respect to the proprietary software, the testimony presented at trial was that April 
learned that the software was not written from scratch when she read the manual for the first time 
in November 2006. She testified that previously, she "hired people" to read the manual for her. 
She was aware of the need to read the manual, had the means to do so, but chose not to. There 
was no testimony that suggested that Christa deprived her of information or discouraged her 
from reading the manual. Therefore, the evidence was undisputed that April could have become 
aware of the facts regarding her software by acting as a reasonable person would, and referring 
to the manual. 
Equitable estoppel requires that the Plaintiff prove that Christa made a false statement or 
concealment of material fact; that Christa made it with the intent that she rely on it; that April 
did not know or could not discover the truth; and that April relied and acted upon the 
misstatements and concealments. 157 The evidence at trial, taken in the light most favorable to the 
Plaintiff, simply cannot be construed to establish that Christa intentionally concealed facts from 
April (Christa spoke openly and publicly at the Exchange Club meeting about how she did not 
156 R. 396, J.I. 34.2 
157 R. 397,11. 35 
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write the software from scratch) or that April could not discover the truth (all she had to do was 
read the manual). 
Rather than submit the issue to a jury, the Court should have granted directed verdict or 
JNOV on the breach of contract and warranty claims on grounds that both were barred by the 
statute of limitations. 
I. The Court's Judgment on Defendant CBl's Counterclaim Should be Reversed or 
Remanded for New Trial. 
The jury's verdict on the counterclaim is suspect, given the obvious passion and prejudice 
on the part of the jury, and its clear failure to follow the instruction of the Court. Further, it was 
admitted that ABI breached the contract, in that it failed to make payments as required. It is clear 
that the jury found Plaintiff did not breach the contract only because it improperly found that the 
Defendant committed fraud and breached the contract. As these findings should be reversed on 
appeal, as argued above, the jury's verdict on the counterclaim should be reversed, and damages 
awarded; or, at the very least, Defendant should be awarded a new trial on its counterclaim. 
Under Rule 59( a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, a new trial may be granted for, 
inter alia, any of the following reasons: irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or 
adverse party or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial; excessive damages or inadequate damages, appearing to have 
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice; or insufficiency of the evidence to justify 
the verdict or other decision, or that it is against the law. 
The Court below, having found that the jury ignored its instructions when it found fraud 
against the Estate in the absence of any admissible evidence thereof, and having further found 
that the jury was influenced by passion and prejudice when it awarded damages in excess of the 
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proof, abused its discretion when it failed to grant Defendants a new trial. The jury's misconduct 
in ignoring its instructions was clear evidence that its appraisal of the evidence could not be 
trusted. In any event, should this Court find that the judgment entered in favor of the Plaintiff 
should be reversed, then Defendant CBI should be grfuited a remand for a new trial in order to 
have a fair opportunity for a decision on its counterclaim. 
J. Defendants are Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
The Defendants are entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 12-120(3), as this is an action on a commercial transaction, as argued by the Plaintiff and 
found by the trial Court on Plaintiffs motion for fees. IS8 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(1) 
permits a court to award fees to the prevailing party when provided for by statute. Idaho 
Appellate Rule 41 permits awards of fees on appeal when otherwise permitted by rule, contract, 
or statute. The claims and counterclaims in this case arise from a commercial transaction. The 
term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except transactions for 
personal or household purposes.159 This case arises from the sale of a business from Defendant 
CBI to Plaintiff ABI. All claims and counterclaims arise from this transaction, as Plaintiff would 
have no claim of any kind against ABI but for the transaction. For fees to be awarded, the action 
must be one to recover on the contract. Cheney v. Agri-Lines Corp., 106 Idaho 687, 682 P.2d 640 
(App. 1984). Both the claims and the counterclaims sought recovery on the contract. 
Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to an award of fees on appeal as the prevailing party. 
CONCLUSION 
This case went to trial on two claims of fraud premised on misrepresentations as to the 
ownership of a library of computer files and the origin of a string of macros and commands; 
158 R. 500-503 
159 I.C. §12-120(3) 
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breaches of contract and warranty based on the same claims; and a counterclaim to require the 
plaintiff to pay for the business it purchased. As demonstrated above, the Plaintiff failed to 
produce evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found fraud, or breach of warranty or 
contract; the Plaintiff failed to prove any damages that were more than remote or speculative; 
the Plaintiff failed even to put forth sufficient facts to demonstrate prima facie claims for fraud 
and breach. However, the Plaintiff raised the specter of a daughter cheated out of her inheritance, 
and with that specter inflamed the passions and prejudices of the jury. 
This Court may and should hold as a matter of law that the evidence presented at trial 
was not sufficient to prove the Plaintiff's claims, and reverse the judgment entered by the Court 
below with respect to the fraud and breach claims, and the award of damages against Defendants 
CBI and Kenneth Rammel!. This Court should reverse the judgment entered with respect to 
CBI's counterclaim, and remand to the trial court for an award of damages. In the alternative, 
Defendants respectfully request that the counterclaim be remanded to the trial court for a new 
trial. 
Dated this 2nd day of October, 2013. 
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE 
(;~ILEY' CHARTE 
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